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Abstract 
 
This paper is a first attempt to analyse the implications of the 2000 corporate tax reform on 
ownership concentration in Germany. The empirical results document a fall in ownership 
concentration and a decrease in the power of top institutional owners including the big banks. 
The description of German corporate governance as a bank-based system may hence no 
longer apply. However, contrary to what was expected by proponents of the reform, the 
corporate tax reform did not revolutionise German corporate governance. Ownership 
concentration in 2005 is still high compared to the Anglo-American economies and an active 
market for corporate control is not observed.  
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I. Introduction 
 
One of the most significant developments in German corporate governance was the change in 
corporate income tax law (Körperschaftssteuergesetz), which was introduced in 2000 and 
took effect at the beginning of 2002. The 2000 corporate tax reform totally abolished the tax 
on profits from the sale of long-term equity stakes held by banks and large firms. It was 
expected that the corporate tax reform would encourage firms to sell off their big share blocks 
on a large scale and hence create a less concentrated ownership structure in Germany (Lane 
2004). It was also hoped that the more dispersed ownership would provide investment 
opportunities for outsiders, make firms more vulnerable to takeovers and thereby create a 
more active market for shareholder orientation (Deeg 2001). 
The change in the corporate income tax law was presumably introduced because many 
politicians and economists thought that it was useful to create an Anglo-American system 
with a strong focus on shareholder wealth maximisation in Germany. It was argued that 
European integration and globalisation, which expand product, labour and capital markets 
beyond national boundaries expose countries to the pressure of adopting a governance system 
that comes as close as possible to the outsider controlled model of the Anglo-American 
economies (Walter 1993). However, the Anglo-American system with its dispersed ownership 
structure is an exception as typically most economies have very concentrated ownership (La 
Porta et al 1999). One explanation that has been put forward to explain this high level of 
ownership concentration is that it may be the result of weak shareholder protection (La Porta 
et al 1997, 1998). It is hence not clear whether one can expect major changes to ownership 
concentration in Germany just as a consequence of the corporate tax reform. 
By assembling a new and unused dataset, the aim of this paper is to investigate how 
ownership concentration has changed in Germany as a response to the 2000 corporate tax 
reform and to thereby assess the extent to which significant changes have taken place in the 
German system of corporate governance. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt 
to analyse the effects of the 2000 corporate tax reform on ownership concentration in detail. A 
dataset describing ownership of German listed companies for the years 1999, 2001, 2003 and 
2005 is used. The data is based on the disclosure standard under the 1995 transposition of the 
European Union's Large Holdings Directive into German law under which companies are 
required to disclose voting blocks larger than 5%. The empirical findings document a 
significant decrease in ownership concentration from 2001 to 2005. It is also found that the 
power of top institutional owners including the big banks decreases significantly. The 
description of the German corporate governance system as a bank-based system may hence no 
longer apply. However, because ownership concentration overall is still very high among 
listed companies in 2005 and no active takeover market is observed, the findings of this paper 
suggest that the 2000 corporate tax reform did not revolutionise corporate governance in 
Germany and that the transformation to a capital market-based system so far has not taken 
place. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
empirical evidence and theories of corporate ownership. Sections 3 and 4 outline the method 
and data used in this paper. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Ownership Concentration: Theory and Evidence 
 
Ownership concentration is a central issue of the theory of corporate governance (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Until the 1990s it was generally assumed that the widely held corporation was 
common (Becht and Mayer 2000). However, in the 1990s empirical data revealed that 
concentrated ownership dominates worldwide with the exception of the US and the UK (La 
Porta et al 1999). There is very little empirical evidence on whether this concentrated 
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ownership that was observed in the 1990s has been stable or whether there have been 
important changes in ownership structures. Van der Elst (2000) and Wojcik (2003) both 
observe falling ownership concentration and a growing number of widely held firms in 
Germany in the late 1990s. Wojcik (2003) concludes that whilst ownership concentration in 
Germany seems to have fallen in the late 1990s it is still very high in comparison to other 
countries. 
Several explanations have been put forward to explain this very high level of ownership 
concentration in Germany. It has been argued that the high ownership concentration observed 
in the traditional system of German corporate governance is necessary for a system with 
codetermination, because, given the powers of employees; owners could not assure 
themselves a return on their investment without large shareholdings (Roe 1998). According to 
La Porta et al (1998), the highly concentrated ownership structure in Germany may also be 
the result of weak shareholder protection. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) argue that the widely 
held corporation is likely to be more common in countries with good legal protection of 
minority shareholders because in these countries controlling shareholders are less likely to be 
expropriated if they lose control through a takeover. Hence, controlling shareholders may be 
willing to cut their ownership of voting rights in order to raise funds or to diversify. 
According to this theory, the developments that took place from the mid 1990s until the 
beginning of the millennium, which strengthened the position of minority shareholders, might 
have contributed to a more disperse ownership in Germany. Among those developments were 
the creation of a new supervisory authority, the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den 
Wertpapierhandel, (BAWe, since 2002 incorporated into the new Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzaufsicht, BAFin) (Hackethal et al 2005). Furthermore in 2002 the new German 
takeover law was introduced, which incorporated a mandatory takeover bid (Schmidt 2003). 
Some authors argue that these developments greatly improved investor protection in Germany 
and that the assessment of La Porta et al (1998), which views German capital markets as 
underdeveloped does not seem justified any more (Nowak 2004 and Theissen 2004). 
However, others stress that the new supervisory authority lacks enforcement power and that it 
is hence difficult to argue that the new legal elements pave the way for an active market for 
shareholder orientation (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2004)1. It is hence not clear whether one 
should expect ownership concentration to have fallen as a result of these developments. 
Research on the German corporate governance system has not only found a very high level of 
ownership concentration but has also emphasised that a majority of owners of listed 
companies are financial and non-financial firms (Franks and Mayer 2001). La Porta et al 
(1998) claim that Germany is in fact one of the few countries in which financial institutions 
play an essential role as owners. However, some research also shows that the description of 
the German system as bank-based is not confirmed by the empirical evidence (Edwards and 
Nibler 2000). It has been argued that the role of banks in holding equity stakes has been 
overemphasised. Banks may frequently hold equity stakes as the result of rescuing firms that 
are in financial distress. Banks may have no desire to hold large equity stakes for control 
purposes but may simply find that they end up with them as a result of cancelling the debts of 
financially distressed firms and replacing them with equity stakes. According to this view, it 
can be expected that the corporate tax reform induced banks to reduce these equity stakes 
because they no longer faced a large tax bill when selling them. 
Non-financial firms also have an essential role as owners and there exist plausible theoretical 
arguments for why non-financial firms hold equity stakes for control purposes. As Goergen et 
al (2004) point out for a non-financial firm such as a car manufacturer a large shareholding in 
a supply firm can yield an important strategic advantage. By being represented on the 
supervisory board of the supplier, the car manufacturer can obtain private information on the 
                                                
1  For an exhaustive list of developments see Höpner (2001) 
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firm's cost structure or on supply contracts with competitors. The presence on the supervisory 
board can also mitigate hold-up problems. Since the supplier can put the car manufacturer into 
a difficult position by not delivering the necessary car supplies on time, the manufacturer has 
a strong incentive to buy equity in the supply firm and hence to ensure the delivery. If the 
above arguments are correct, then it is likely that the 2000 corporate tax reform would have a 
less significant effect on ownership of non-financial firms as many of these firms enjoy 
benefits of control from holding large voting blocks. 
It is hence not only important to assess whether ownership concentration has been stable, it is 
also essential to investigate whether the structure of owners of listed companies has changed 
and whether top institutional owners such as big banks maintained their power in corporate 
governance. There are several studies on the structure of share ownership in Germany before 
the corporate tax reform was implemented. Prigge (1998) covering the period from 1984-1996 
finds that the share of non-financial corporations is growing whilst that of financial 
corporations is stable. Wojcik (2003) investigating data for the years 1997 and 2001 finds that 
the share of non-financial corporations is increasing whilst that of the financial corporations is 
falling. There is very little research on whether the role of top institutional owners has been 
changing. However, the observations of O'Sullivan (2000) suggest that big banks and insurers 
are selling their stakes and leaving boardrooms. 
Related to the question of whether top-institutional owners have maintained their power in 
German corporate governance is whether the role of cross-holdings has changed. Cross-
holdings have been shown to be very significant in the past, especially among those 
companies that have been referred to as the top 7 institutional owners (Prowse 1994, Wenger 
and Kaserer 1998). Among those seven companies are the Deutsche Bank AG, the Allianz 
AG, the E.ON AG, the Dresdner Bank AG, the Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, the 
RWE AG and the Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG. The Allianz AG has often 
been called the spider of the web of cross-holdings because it holds voting rights in almost all 
of the other top-institutional owners (Story and Walter 1997). There is very little empirical 
evidence on whether the role of cross-holdings was already changing before the 
implementation of the corporate tax reform in 2002. Wojcik (2003) finds that the cross-
holdings among the top 7 owners remain largely unchanged between 1997 and 2001. Whilst 
politicians and economists expected that the corporate tax reform would reduce the scope of 
cross-holdings between the top-institutional holders, further empirical evidence is needed. 
 
III. Data and Method 
A. Data 
 
The data used in this paper is provided by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzaufsicht, BAFin 
(formerly the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe) for four points in time: 
1st January 1999, 1st January 2001, 1st January 2003 and 1st January 2005. The dataset is 
based on the disclosure standard that implements the European Union's Large Holdings 
Directive (88/627/EEC) and the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 
WpHG). Under this law all voting rights at the command of blockholders controlling at least 
5% of the voting rights have to be disclosed. This obligation refers to both direct and indirect 
holdings of voting rights.2 An entity controls an indirect voting right from a share that he does 
not own. This may be the case if an entity controls a direct shareholder or has been entrusted 
with the responsibility for his shares (Wojcik 2003). The law also requires the disclosure of 
identity of those in command of voting power irrespective of their `distance' from the listed 
                                                
2 The term holding, blockholding and voting block will be used interchangeably to denote the 
percentage of voting rights in a company held by an entity both directly and indirectly. 
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company (Becht and Böhmer 2003). The database hence consists of the following parts: all 
domestic companies listed on amtlicher Handel (Official market) and the holders of major 
voting rights in these companies. A detailed investigation of how voting power is measured 
under the WpHG as well as of the shortcomings of the database can be found in Becht and 
Böhmer (2003). In addition to the dataset on major holding rights in listed companies, the 
FTSE Global Classification System (Version 2002) is used in order to classify the listed 
companies into different industries.  
 
B. Method 
 
According to the theoretical and empirical evidence presented in Section 3, it is expected that 
ownership concentration decreases between 1999 and 2005. If ownership falls continuously 
from 1999 to 2005, then the drop in ownership could be attributed to those developments in 
Germany that strengthened the power of minority shareholders. Hence, if the corporate tax 
reform had any effect at all on ownership concentration, acceleration in the decline in 
ownership concentration should be observed between 2001 and 2003. The first hypothesis to 
be tested is hence the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The concentration of blockholdings falls between 1999 and 2005 and the fall in 
concentration is greater between 2001 and 2003 than between 1999 and 2001. 
 
In order to examine how ownership concentration changes between 1999 and 2005, the whole 
population of listed firms in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 is analysed and the empirical 
distribution and summary statistics for ultimate voting blocks are computed. Voting Blocks 
for each firm are ranked according to their size and we compute the median size of the first, 
second and third largest voting block. We also compute the mean and median size of the sum 
of the first, second and third largest voting block in each firm as well as the mean and median 
size of the sum of all voting blocks in each firm.  
The listed firms in the sample are then classified according to the FTSE Global Classification 
System and summary statistics for each industry are computed in order to determine how 
concentration has changed across different industries. From the evidence on ownership 
concentration in Germany it is not clear what to expect. However, it is very probable that 
holders of voting rights in the non-financial industries range from financial to non-financial 
corporations and also include individuals. Since a general fall in ownership concentration is 
expected and holders of voting rights in non-financial industries probably include a mix of all 
blockholders, a fall in the average concentration across these industries seems likely. In the 
financial industries the majority of holders are likely to be financial corporations themselves. 
Since financial corporations often may not hold voting rights for control purposes, it can be 
expected that these blocks are sold as a result of the corporate tax reform. A more or less 
universal decrease in ownership concentration across non-financial and financial industries is 
hence expected. The following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The decrease in ownership concentration across different industries is 
nearly universal. 
 
It is also investigated whether there has been a change in the power of blockholders and 
especially whether banks and other financial firms, which have often been characterised as an 
important part of the German corporate governance system, have lost some of their power in 
terms of blockholdings. It is hence examined how voting power has changed across 
blockholders. According to the theoretical and empirical evidence provided in Section 3, 
financial and non-financial corporations are the most important blockholders. It is likely that 
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as a result of the corporate tax reform financial firms sold large blocks of their holdings 
because very often they are not held for control purposes. A smaller reduction in the 
blockholdings of non-financial firms can be expected, since non-financial firms hold voting 
rights for control and strategic purposes. The following hypothesis is hence tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The two most important holders of major voting rights are financial and non-
financial firms. Whilst the share of non-financial firms in listed companies falls at best 
slightly as a result of the corporate tax reform, financial firms experience a significant decline 
between 2001 and 2005. 
 
The above hypothesis is investigated by calculating the number of voting blocks for each type 
of blockholder as well as by providing summary statistics such as the mean and median size 
of voting blocks for each type of blockholder. Following Becht and Böhmer (2003) we divide 
blockholders into the following categories: industrial firms, individuals, banks, holdings 
(Verwaltungsgesellschaften), insurance firms, investment firms (Beteiligungsgesellschaften), 
public, associations, worker/family pool, coops, foundations and foreign companies. First, all 
listed companies are investigated. Since cross-holdings among financial companies are very 
common (Franks and Mayer 2001), we then investigate blockholdings across all non-financial 
companies. 
The fourth hypothesis to be tested relates to the power of the top institutional owners such as 
the big banks. According to the empirical and theoretical evidence presented in section 3, one 
would expect that the top-institutional owners lost some of their power between 2001 and 
2005. There is very limited evidence available on the scope of cross-holdings. However, since 
many economists expected that the corporate tax reform would lead to an erosion of the web 
of cross-holdings, the following is hypothesised: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The power of the top-institutional owners decreases between 2001 and 2005 
and there is an erosion of the web of cross-holdings between the top 7 institutional owners. 
 
In order to assess whether the role of top institutional owners has changed, the number of 
blocks controlled by top institutional owners are identified. We list all blockholders 
controlling votes in five or more listed companies in either 2001 or 2005 and investigate 
whether they experience a decline in the number of voting blocks controlled and in the 
average size of voting blocks. It is then investigated whether the role of cross-holdings has 
changed between 2001 and 2005. We examine how many of the holders of major voting 
rights in the top 7 institutional owners are top-institutional owners themselves and whether 
there have been significant changes in the size of their voting blocks between 2001 and 2005. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Hypothesis 1: The level of ownership concentration 
 
Between 1999 and 2005 there is a substantial rise in the number of listed companies under 
consideration, with the number of listed companies rising from 425 in 1999 to 753 in 2005. 
Figure 1 shows the median size of the first, second and third largest voting block in 1999, 
2001, 2003 and 2005. The median size of all voting blocks is also shown. It can be seen that 
there is a significant drop in the median size of the first, second and third largest voting block 
from 2001 to 2003 and from 2003 to 2005. The median size of the largest voting block seems 
to be affected most.  
Table 1 shows that the mean size of the largest voting block (C1) falls from 59.76% in 1999 to 
52.62% in 2005. This decrease is not continuous as there is a slight increase from 1999 to 
2001. From 2001 and 2003, there is a significant fall in the mean size of the largest voting 
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block with the mean size falling by almost 6%. From 2003 to 2005 there is again a decrease of 
approximately 2% in the mean size of the largest voting block, which is however, smaller than 
from 2001 to 2003. The median size of the largest voting block also falls between 1999 and 
2005. Again there is a slight increase from 1999 to 2001. From 2001 to 2005 the median size 
of the largest voting block falls by more than 12%, from 62.81% to 50.1%. The most 
significant decrease takes place between the years 2001 and 2003, between which the median 
size falls by almost 10 percent. 
Voting power is highly concentrated in most companies. When there exist multiple voting 
blocks in the same firm they do not add much voting power. Adding the second and third 
largest voting block (C3) increases the mean concentration ration by 11.5% to 71.26 % in 
19993. Including all blockholders (Call) increases the mean concentration ratio to 73.29% in 
1999. 
As can be seen from table 1, the mean and median concentration ratio of C3 and Call follow 
more or less the same pattern as the mean and median of C1. Whilst there is a slight increase 
in voting power from 1999 to 2001, there is a significant decrease in the mean and median of 
C3 and Call from 2001 to 2005. These results suggest that voting power in companies falls 
between 2001 and 2005 and that the most significant drop takes place between 2001 and 
2003. 
Table 1 also shows the empirical distribution of blockholdings. The block size distribution 
confirms that the concentration of voting rights has fallen between 1999 and 2005 and that 
ownership concentration has been and still is very concentrated. At the lower end of the 
distribution, 15.5% of each company's largest voting block is smaller than 25% in 1999 
whereas in 2005, 25.2% are smaller than 25%. At the top end of the distribution, 39.1% of 
voting blocks are greater than 75% in 1999 and 31.6% of voting blocks are greater than 75% 
in 2005.  
To summarise, the findings presented in this section clearly support hypothesis 1. There is a 
significant fall in ownership concentration as measured by the concentration of voting blocks 
among listed companies between 1999 and 2005. The most significant decrease takes place 
between 2001 and 2003, which suggests that the corporate tax reform had a significant effect 
on ownership concentration. Nevertheless ownership of listed companies is still very 
concentrated in 2005 as indicated by the mean and median size of the largest voting block, 
which still exceeds 50% and the block size distribution. 
 
B. Hypothesis 2: Changes in ownership concentration across different industries 
 
Table 2 shows the sector structure of listed companies in 2001 and 2005. It can be seen that 
whilst some industries experience a rising share of listed companies between 2001 and 2005, 
the share of other industries as a proportion of total listed companies declines. The industry 
that experiences the highest growth in the number of listed companies is the information 
technology and hardware sector. In 2001, 1.8% of listed companies are in the IT sector, 
whereas in 2005 almost 11% of listed companies are in the IT sector. The telecommunication 
services sector also experiences a rise in listed companies with the percentage of listed 
companies almost tripling between 2001 and 2005. Other industries show a marked decline in 
listed companies. As table 2 shows, the number of banks, insurance companies and 
investment firms as a proportion of total listed companies decreases between 2001 and 2005. 
In addition there is a significant fall in the number of firms as a percentage of all listed 
                                                
3 Cn is the sum of the n largest blockholdings in each listed companies. For example if there 
were 3 listed companies in the sample, then the mean of Cn is computed by adding up the 
sums of the n largest blockholdings in each company and dividing this sum by 3. 
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companies in the building and construction, steel and automobile industries. This suggests, 
that the importance of the technology sectors has increased whilst that of the more traditional 
industries decreased between 2001 and 2005. Changes in ownership concentration across 
different industries are also examined. Figures 2 and 3 show the median size of voting blocks 
in the most important non-financial as well as financial industries in 2001 and 2005. In Figure 
2 it can be seen that the decrease in ownership concentration across the non-financial sector is 
almost universal across industries. The majority of industries experience a marked decline in 
the median size of voting blocks between 2001 and 2005. Among those industries that 
experience a significant decline are telecommunication services, transport, pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology, electronics, chemicals and steel. Whilst Figure 2 also shows an increase in 
the median size of voting blocks in industries such as energy, beverages and personal care and 
household products, the number of observations for these industries is in general quite small 
and thus the results are not very conclusive. Figure 3 shows the median size of voting blocks 
in the financial sector industries. It can be seen that the insurance industry experiences a large 
fall in the median size of voting blocks between 2001 and 2005. Investment companies and 
the specialty and finance industry also experience a decline which is however not as marked 
as in the insurance industry. Banks and real estate experience a rise in the size of the median 
voting block. With the exception of banks and real estate, there hence seems to be a decrease 
in ownership concentration amongst the industries in the financial sector. Whilst this decrease 
is not universal, overall it seems as if there had been a significant decrease of ownership 
concentration across the financial industries. These results hence support hypothesis 2. 
 
C. Hypothesis 3: Control across blockholders 
 
There are 921 blockholdings in 2001 compared to 1679 blockholdings in 2005. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of blockholdings in all listed companies for 2001 and 2005. It can be seen that 
individuals and families hold most blocks in 2001 and 2005, but that the mean holding 
(24.9% in 2001 and 25.1% in 2005) is smaller than that of industrial firms (53.3% in 2001 and 
41% in 2005). Table 3 also shows that the share of the entities in the financial sector is small 
compared to the share of individuals and industrial companies. The percentage of total 
blockholdings of the whole financial sector is 29.9% in 2001 and 24.8% in 2005, which is less 
than that of individuals in both years. This observation gives support to the observation of 
Edwards and Nibler (2000) and Edwards and Fisher (1994) that the role of financial 
companies and especially banks is limited. These findings also partially contradict hypothesis 
3, since the largest groups of blockholders are wealthy families and non-financial corporations 
followed by financial institutions. These observations do, however, confirm the findings of 
Böhmer and Becht (2001) who come to the same conclusion. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of blockholdings in non-financial companies. It can be seen 
that the share of individuals and families is rising in terms of the proportion of blockholdings 
held but that the mean size of their blockholdings is falling. The share of industrial firms is 
falling sharply from 2001 to 2005 in terms of the number of blocks held and the mean size of 
their blockholdings. Foreign firms experience a rising share of voting blocks but a decrease in 
the mean size of their blockholdings. The position of the financial sector seems to be 
deteriorating significantly although the big three banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and 
Commerzbank) are an exception to this to some extent4. The big three banks as well insurance 
companies experience a significant decline in terms of the percentage of blocks held between 
2001 and 2005. Insurance companies also experience a decline in the mean size of their 
blockholdings, whereas the mean size of blockholdings of the three big banks increases 
                                                
4 In 2001 Dresdner bank still exists as a separate entity whereas in 2005 in belongs to the Allianz Group. Hence 
in 2005, there are only 2 out of the big 3 banks left 
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between 2001 and 2005. As table 4 shows, this increase is however, offset by the sharp 
decline in the mean size of blockholdings of the other banks5. 
There is hence evidence that the big firms such as non-financial corporations and companies 
in the financial sector are selling large blocks of their voting rights. The results partly 
contradict hypothesis 3 since we observe a significant decrease in the power of both non-
financial as well as financial firms in terms of the number and size of their blockholdings. The 
reason for this may be that the blocks of shares held by non-financial corporations are very 
often blocks of shares in `unrelated' firms and hence the control benefits are limited6.  
The results in this section hence support the observation of O'Sullivan (2000) that insurance 
companies and banks are losing some of their power. They also confirm the findings of the 
earlier sections namely that the 2000 corporate tax reform had a significant effect on 
ownership concentration and that it has led to a decrease in the power of blockholders. The 
next section examines changes in the power of the top-institutional holders in more detail by 
focusing on the identity of large shareholders. 
 
D. Hypothesis 4: The role of top-institutional owners 
 
First, the number of blockholders and the number of their holdings in listed companies in 
2001 and 2005 are analysed. The results are shown in table 5. It can be seen that most 
shareholders (87.17% in 2001 and 88.8% in 2005) hold just one voting block. It is then 
investigated who the holders of the multiple voting blocks are. Table 6 lists all blockholders 
controlling votes in five or more listed companies in either 2001 or 2005. It can be seen that in 
2001 and 2005 the holders of multiple voting blocks are mostly banks and insurance 
companies. Table 6 also shows that most of those companies that have often been quoted as 
the top 7 institutional holders are experiencing a decline in the number of voting blocks they 
control. Between 2001 and 2005, Deutsche Bank AG halves its holdings in listed companies 
from 20 to 10. The Allianz AG increases its holdings from 19 to 21 between 2001 and 2005. 
However, since in 2005 the Dresdner Bank, which holds 13 voting blocks in 2001, belongs to 
the Allianz AG, there is evidence that the Allianz AG sells some of its holdings between 2001 
and 2005. The E.ON AG and RWE AG decrease their holdings from 12 voting blocks to 8 
and 11 voting blocks to 7 respectively between 2001 and 2005. Whilst the Bayerische Hypo- 
und Vereinsbank AG holds 11 voting blocks in 2001 as well as in 2005, the mean and median 
of its voting blocks decreases significantly between 2001 and 2005, with the mean falling 
from 52.6% to 37.8%. The Münchener Rückversicherungsgesellschaft is the only institutional 
holder of the top 7 that increases its holdings from 2001 to 2005. However, the mean of its 
holding blocks is falling from approximately 31% to 27%. Table 6 also shows that in 2005 
there are some foreign companies with multiple holdings, the mean of which is in general 
relatively small. These findings and those of the previous section suggests that there is an 
increase in the number of foreign holders of voting rights in Germany, but that the average 
voting block held by these companies is relatively small. 
It is also investigated whether the scope of cross-holdings among the top 7 institutional 
owners changes between 2001 and 2005. The results are shown in table 7. It can be seen that a 
majority of the top 7 institutional owners that hold voting blocks in one of the other top 7 
institutional companies sell some of these stakes between 2001 and 2005 and that the size of 
cross-holdings decreases significantly between 2001 and 2005. Since there is evidence 
                                                
5 The most important group in the category `other banks' are the Landesbanken, which are usually owned by the 
governments of the `Länder' 
6 This is in fact exactly what Schmidt (2004) observes. In contrast to Rieckers and Spindler (2004) who claim 
that the blocks of shares held by other corporations are part of complex structures of groups of related 
companies, Schmidt claims that the majority of holdings of non-financial companies are in fact in completely 
unrelated companies. 
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provided by Wojcik that the role of cross-holdings did not change between 1997 and 2001, 
this suggests a significant influence of the 2000 corporate tax reform on the structure of 
ownership in Germany. 
The results in this section hence strongly suggest that the top-institutional holders have lost 
some of their power as holders of voting blocks, with the Deutsche Bank AG being a 
particularly striking example because it halved its voting rights between 2001 and 2005. 
There also has been an erosion of the web of cross-holdings between the top 7 institutional 
owners. Hypothesis 4 is hence confirmed by the empirical findings of this paper. The 
conclusions of the earlier sections are also strengthened, namely that the corporate tax reform 
had a significant effect not only on ownership concentration overall but also on the power of 
top institutional owners in terms of their blockholdings. There is furthermore evidence that 
the corporate tax reform led to a disintegration of the web of cross-holdings between the top 7 
institutional owners just as had been expected by the proponents of the reform. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
According to the evidence provided in this paper the corporate tax reform had a significant 
effect on ownership concentration in Germany. The mean and median size of major voting 
blocks fell significantly between 1999 and 2005, with the most significant decline taking 
place between 2001 and 2003. This suggests, that it is possible to isolate the effects of the 
corporate tax reform from other major developments in German corporate governance, which 
strengthened the power of minority shareholders to some extent but which took place before 
2000. It was also expected that the corporate tax reform would induce the top institutional 
owners such as the big banks and insurance companies to sell their blockholdings. The 
empirical evidence clearly confirms this. The findings of this paper document that as a result 
of the 2000 corporate tax reform the power of the big blockholders, such as banks and 
insurance companies diminished and that the web of cross-holdings among the top-
institutional owners has been disintegrated. This also suggests a significant influence of the 
2000 corporate tax reform on the structure of ownership in Germany. 
Furthermore there is evidence that the role of banks changed between 2001 and 2005 as the 
big banks such as the Deutsche Bank sold many of their equity stakes and hence lost some of 
their power as major holders of voting rights in listed companies. According to Hackethal et 
al (2005), the big banks have also reduced their corporate lending activities considerably and 
seem to be trying to become what might almost be described as investment banks. These two 
developments together suggest, that the big banks are reducing their active involvement in 
German corporate governance. Since the importance of banks has often been presented as a 
building block of the German corporate governance system, these changes are quite 
fundamental and it may hence no longer be accurate to refer to the German corporate 
governance system as a bank-based system. 
However, even though the corporate tax reform had a significant effect on ownership 
concentration and on the power of the top-institutional blockholders, the change in the 
corporate income tax law did not revolutionise German corporate governance. Ownership 
concentration is still very high in Germany compared to the dispersed ownership structure that 
is found in the Anglo-American countries. It also very much seems as if the corporate tax 
reform had a once and for all effect on ownership concentration, since deconcentration, 
although still very significant, slowed down between 2003 and 2005 compared to 2001 and 
2003. An explanation for this may be that the system of codetermination, which requires 
concentrated ownership, is still in place and that it is debatable whether the power of minority 
shareholders has been sufficiently strengthened. 
There is also yet no evidence that the change in the capital gains taxation resulted in a wave of 
takeovers (Hackethal et al 2005). Whilst the Mannesmann-Vodaphone take-over battle of 
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1999 and 2000 was a hostile one, the success of Vodaphone in taking over Mannesmann has 
not been the beginning of an active public takeover market in Germany. The reasons that have 
always made hostile tender offers difficult in Germany, such as the legal structure of German 
joint stock corporations with the codetermination as part of it still apply (Schmidt 2004). In 
addition, according to Becht (1999) dispersed ownership is a prerequisite for an open market 
for corporate control and the concentrated ownership that still prevails in Germany protects 
companies from hostile bids. Hence, although many significant changes have been observed 
in the German corporate governance system, the transformation to a capital market-based 
system so far has not taken place. 
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Table 1: Empirical Distribution of Voting Blocks 
Year Range C1 C3 C all 
  Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
 A.Empirical distribution       
1999 0-24.99% 66 15.53 27 6.35 27 6.35 
 25-49.99% 81 19.06 59 13.88 45 10.59 
 50-74.99% 112 26.35 106 24.94 104 24.47 
 75-100% 166 39.06 233 54.82 249 58.59 
 Total 425 100.00 425 100.00 425 100.00 
        
2001 0-24.99% 74 16.30 26 5.73 25 5.51 
 25-49.99% 87 19.16 73 16.08 56 12.33 
 50-74.99% 109 24.01 105 23.13 106 23.35 
 75-100% 184 40.53 250 55.07 267 58.81 
 Total 454 100.00 454 100.00 454 100.00 
        
2003 0-24.99% 159 23.31 79 11.58 73 10.70 
 25-49.99% 142 20.82 114 16.72 94 13.78 
 50-74.99% 148 21.70 182 26.69 185 27.13 
 75-100% 233 34.16 307 45.01 330 48.39 
 Total 682 100.00 682 100.00 682 100.00 
        
2005 0-24.99% 190 25.23 85 11.29 80 10.62 
 25-49.99% 175 23.24 149 19.79 124 16.47 
 50-74.99% 150 19.92 198 26.29 204 27.09 
 75-100% 238 31.61 321 42.63 345 45.82 
 Total 753 100.00 753 100.00 753 100.00 
        
 B. Descriptive 
Statistics 
      
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1999  59.76 61.40 71.26 76.10 73.29 79.00 
2001  60.16 62.81 71.22 77.48 73.59 80.99 
2003  54.84 52.90 65.44 69.59 67.45 73.80 
2005  52.62 50.10 64.15 66.50 66.80 70.63 
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Table 2: Industry structure of listed companies 
 
Industry 
No. of 
firms % of total firms 
 No. of 
firms % of total firms 
  2001   2005   
Aerospace and Defense 0 0.00 1 0.13 
Automobiles and Parts 18 3.96 18 2.39 
Banks 27 5.95 28 3.72 
Beverages 27 5.95 23 3.05 
Chemicals 26 5.73 26 3.45 
Construction and Building materials 42 9.25 45 5.98 
Diversified Industrials 5 1.10 12 1.59 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 14 3.08 33 4.38 
Energy 14 3.08 17 2.26 
Engineering and Machinery 32 7.05 38 5.05 
Food Producers and Processors 7 1.54 11 1.46 
Forestry and Paper 5 1.10 4 0.53 
General Retailing 16 3.52 22 2.92 
Health 7 1.54 21 2.79 
Household Goods and Textiles 40 8.81 52 6.91 
Information Technology and 
Hardware 8 1.76 81 10.76 
Insurance 18 3.96 16 2.12 
Investment Companies 16 3.52 32 4.25 
Leisure, Entertainment and Hotels 12 2.64 34 4.52 
Media and Photography 2 0.44 28 3.72 
Mining 1 0.22 2 0.27 
Oil and Gas 0 0.00 2 0.27 
Personal Care and Household 
Products 3 0.66 4 0.53 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 12 2.64 24 3.19 
Real Estate 22 4.85 29 3.85 
Specialty and other Finance 21 4.63 35 4.65 
Steel and other Metals 14 3.08 10 1.33 
Support Services 6 1.32 30 3.98 
Telecommunication Services 4 0.88 21 2.79 
Transport 9 1.98 17 2.26 
Unspecified 13 2.86 31 4.12 
Utilities 13 2.86 6 0.80 
Total 454 100.00 753 100.00 
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Figure 2: Median size of voting blocks in non-financial companies according to their industry 
classification 
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Figure 3: Median size of voting blocks in financial companies according to their industry 
classification 
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Table 3: Holdings of entities in listed companies 
 
Blockholder Number of voting 
blocks 
% of total Number of voting 
blocks 
% of total Mean  
 2001 2005 2001 2005
Industrial Firm 188 20.41 266 15.84 53.27 41.03
Individual 311 33.77 717 42.70 24.88 25.10
Banks: Big3 39 4.23 20 1.19 25.14 26.35
Banks: Other Domestic 45 4.89 68 4.05 30.31 26.68
Holding 75 8.14 100 5.96 42.66 36.39
Investment Firm 54 5.86 141 8.40 30.88 25.36
Insurance Company 51 5.54 54 3.22 27.75 22.39
Other Financial 11 1.19 33 1.97 31.81 16.91
Public 27 2.93 29 1.73 42.42 51.88
Association,Family Pool 10 1.09 20 1.19 30.73 21.26
Foundation 7 0.76 18 1.07 24.08 28.34
Foreign Company 101 10.97 207 12.33 49.26 35.97
Other 2 0.22 6 0.36 39.06 30.62
Total 921 100.00 1679 100.00 36.29 29.96
 
Table 4: Holdings on entities in non-financial listed companies 
 
Blockholder Number of voting 
blocks 
% of total Number of voting 
blocks 
% of total Mean 
 
 2001 2005 2001 2005
Industrial Firm 169 24.71 239 17.46 53.90 41.52
Individual 236 34.50 601 43.90 27.17 25.30
Banks: Big3 27 3.95 15 1.10 15.00 18.99
Banks: Other Domestic 20 2.92 44 3.21 29.67 21.25
Holding 52 7.60 71 5.19 43.16 35.15
Investment Firm 35 5.12 105 7.67 32.57 23.47
Insurance Company 22 3.22 32 2.34 24.29 17.51
Other Financial 9 1.32 24 1.75 34.53 11.88
Public 21 3.07 19 1.39 40.85 50.15
Association,Family Pool 9 1.32 20 1.46 32.29 21.26
Foundation 5 0.73 15 1.10 20.46 24.25
Foreign Company 75 10.96 178 13.00 45.56 33.77
Other 4 0.58 6 0.44 39.06 30.62
Total 684 100.00 1369 100.00 37.45 29.28
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Table 5: Number of blocks held by blockholders 
 
No. of blocks 2001  2005  
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 598 87.17 1173 88.80 
2 51 7.43 81 6.13 
3 12 1.75 32 2.42 
4 9 1.31 8 0.61 
5 2 0.29 6 0.45 
6 5 0.73 5 0.38 
7 2 0.29 3 0.23 
8 0 0.00 5 0.38 
9 1 0.15 1 0.08 
10 0 0.00 1 0.08 
11 2 0.29 4 0.30 
12 1 0.15 1 0.08 
13 1 0.15 0 0.00 
19 1 0.15 0 0.00 
20 1 0.15 0 0.00 
21 0 0.00 1 0.08 
Total 686 100.00 1321 100.00 
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Table 6: Shareholders controlling more than four votes in either 2001 or 2005 
 
 2001  2005  
Name Number Mean (%) Number Mean (%)
Deutsche Bank AG 20 23.40 10 28.84
Allianz AG 19 25.92 21 23.55
Dresdner Bank AG 13 23.89 0  
E.ON AG 12 51.48 8 72.50
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 11 52.60 11 37.77
RWE 11 62.16 7 57.81
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG 9 30.99 11 27.25
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. 7 66.00 6 63.67
Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale 7 25.48 6 21.78
Commerzbank AG 6 33.65 9 25.70
Energie Baden-Württemberg AG 6 39.06 4 54.81
Merckle, Adolf 6 20.97 8 33.13
WCM Beteiligungs- und Grundbesitz AG 6 46.60 11 51.31
Wüstenrot und Württembergische AG 6 38.00 4 48.84
GIE AXA S.A. 5 38.71 7 17.96
Oetker, Rudolf August 5 90.42 5 58.81
Siemens AG 4 47.64 5 27.85
Westdeutsche Landesbank, Girozentrale 4 14.84 6 13.00
SüdKA SüdKapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH 0  12 6.98
Fidelity International Limited 0  11 6.28
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2 76.42 8 67.92
DWS Investment GmbH 0  8 5.64
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 3 27.15 8 49.85
Baden-Württembergische Versorgungsanstalt für Ärzte, 
Zahnärzte und Tierärzte 0  7 7.40
HSBC Bank plc. 1 73.46 6 18.66
The Capital Group Companies, Inc. 0  6 6.63
Barclays Bank PLC 0  5 5.98
Deutsche Balaton AG 1 5.00 5 18.98
Julius Baer Multistock 0  5 7.68
Universal-Investment-Gesellschaft mbH 0  5 7.92
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Table 7: Crossholdings between the top-7 institutional holders 
 
Name Holders Voting block (%) 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
2001 
6.8 
2005 
No voting rights
 Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 9.31 No voting rights
 Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 10 No voting rights
 Münchener Rückversicherungs- 
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft 
24.99 9.9 
 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
18.27 
 
No voting rights
 E.ON Aktiengesellschaft 8.7 6.72 
 Münchener Rückversicherungs- 
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft 
5.4 18.4 
 
Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
21.97 
 
N/A 
 
E.ON Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
11.46 
 
No voting rights
 
Münchener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
24.9 
 
9.4 
 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
13.29 9.97 
 Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 9.92 No voting rights
 Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 9.1 No voting rights
 
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 
 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft 
 
13.32 
 
7.55 
 
 
 
